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GRILL FLAME PROJECT REPORT

Defense Intelligence Agency
Directorate for Scientific and Technical Intelligence

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PREFACE

(S) This report summarizes results of the three-year GRILL FLAME project, which terminated at the close of FY 1983. It contains key findings from the various project activities, and identifies potential follow-on efforts. The types of investigations, methods used for their evaluation, and other aspects of the GRILL FLAME project also are reviewed. Additional project information is summarized in the appendices, and detailed project reports are listed in the bibliography.

(S) In addition to this DIA evaluation, the GRILL FLAME project also has been reviewed by an independent Scientific Evaluation Team that met in August and September of 1983. The scientific evaluation and recommendations will be forwarded separately.

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PREFACE

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I BACKGROUND

(S/NOFORN/ORCON) Project GRILL FLAME was a joint DIA and Army effort, with DIA providing overall project management and coordination. The project's main goals were to evaluate the threat that foreign psychoenergetics achievements might pose to US national security, and to explore the potential of psychoenergetics for use in US intelligence collection.

(S/NOFORN) Psychoenergetics refers to classes of human capabilities that are parapsychological in nature. There are two main categories, informational and energetic, that can be defined as:

1. Remote viewing (RV)/Extrasensory Perception (ESP) -- ability of an individual to access and describe remote geographic areas or to access and describe concealed data via undefined transmission mechanisms.
2. Psychokinesis (PK) -- mental ability to influence physical or biological systems via undefined physical mechanisms.

(S/NOFORN/ORCON) The primary focus of the GRILL FLAME effort was on remote viewing phenomena. However, psychokinesis research in the USSR, China and other foreign countries was examined to see if the occurrence of remote viewing could be detected by scientific instrumentation. This has implications for possible countermeasures to foreign use of remote viewing.

(S/NOFORN) To assist in achieving GRILL FLAME goals, SRI International was selected as a contractor due to its extensive experience in investigating

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remote viewing phenomenon. In a three-year program, SRI assisted DIA in evaluating the potential threat of foreign achievements in psychoenergetics, and in determining if remote viewing could be developed sufficiently for in-house DoD use. Inherent in this effort were the reality, repeatability, and trainability of remote viewing phenomena. Issues related to scientific understanding of the phenomena, or to phenomena transmission mechanisms, were not addressed, since this was beyond project scope and available resources.

(S/NOFORN) The SRI investigations were designed to follow strict protocols. Scientific evaluation methods were developed to assess project results. To verify adherence to agreed-upon methods and protocols, DIA placed a project monitor on-site for the duration of the GRILL FLAME effort.

(S/NOFORN/ORCON) Funding for the SRI contract was provided jointly by DIA and the Army Intelligence Security Command with a small portion also provided by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. During the past three years, the average funding has been \$492K per year. The staff at SRI on this project consisted of only two senior scientists, a research analyst, a consultant and several support personnel. While the funds have been low and their arrival dates sporadic, many valuable findings and useful data have been produced.

(S/NOFORN/ORCON/WNINTEL) The Army portion of GRILL FLAME also included a small in-house group, located at INSCOM headquarters, that focused exclusively on operational matters, and that supported remote viewing training methods developed at SRI. The Army portion of the GRILL FLAME project was curtailed in 1982 as a result of Congressional authorization action.

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SECRET**II FINDINGS****1. SUMMARY (U)**

(S/NOFORN) Key findings of the GRILL FLAME project are:

- o Remote viewing is a real phenomenon, and is not degraded by distance or shielding.
- o Remote viewing ability can be improved by appropriate training procedures.
- o Remote viewing has potential for US intelligence applications. However, at this stage of development, descriptive content (e.g., sketches, configurations) is more reliable than analytic content (e.g., function, complex technical data).
- o A potential threat to US national security exists from foreign achievements in psychoenergetics. In the USSR and in China, this research is well funded and receives high-level government backing.

(S/NOFORN/ORCON) Achievements of the GRILL FLAME project include development of remote viewing training methods, the development of statistical methods for evaluating remote viewing data, and the compilation of an extensive data base on foreign psychoenergetics research. Methods for improving the reliability of remote viewing data, through detailed understanding of the remote viewing process, and through identification of techniques for isolating valid from spurious data also were achieved. Training techniques that show promise for enhancing the reliability of the analytical content of remote viewing data also were identified.

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2. Discussion (U)

a. General (U)

(S/NOFORN) At the beginning of the three-year program, a considerable data base on remote viewing (RV) had already been established. This included open-literature publication of earlier work by the contractor (SRI)¹ and replication studies by others,² as well as numerous classified reports on remote viewing^{3, 4, 5}.

(S/NOFORN) In designing the three-year program, it was recognized that effective use of RV technology as a routine intelligence collection tool would require that a number of elements be in place. They ranged from the establishment of personnel screening and selection procedures to the

¹ H. Puthoff and R. Targ, "A Perceptual Channel for Information Transfer over Kilometer Distances: Historical Perspective and Recent Research, Proc. IEEE, Vol 64, No. 3, March 1976.

² See, e.g., report by the Princeton University Engineering Anomalies Research Group under the leadership of the Dean of the School of Engineering and Applied Science, R. Jahn, "The Persistent Paradox of Psychic Phenomena: An Engineering Perspective, "Proc. IEEE, Vol. 70, No. 2, February 1982.

³ "Perceptual Augmentation Techniques" (U), Final Report to CIA, SRI Project 3183, Stanford Research Institute, Menlo Park, CA (December 1, 1975), SECRET

⁴ "Advanced Threat Technique Assessment" (U). Final Report to FTD, SRI Project 5309, SRI International, Menlo Park, CA (October 1978), SECRET/NOFORN

⁵ "Special Orientation Techniques" (U), Final Report to Army INSCOM, SRI Project 8465, SRI International, Menlo Park, CA (June 1980), SECRET/NOFORN

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development of countermeasures technology to prevent effective use of RV against US interests. Therefore, at the outset, eight action-item areas were established, which were:

- (1) REMOTE VIEWING ENHANCEMENT, INCLUDING:
 - (a) Alternative targeting strategies, such as targeting by coordinates (CRV), pictures, ID numbers, etc.
 - (b) Before-the-fact indicators of success, such as the use of physiological measures (e.g., audio analysis of session tapes), calibration trials, etc.
- (2) LOCATION/TRACKING "SEARCH" PROBLEM
- (3) TRAINING
- (4) ROUTINE OPERATIONAL RV PROCEDURES
- (5) EVALUATION TECHNIQUES
- (6) DATA BASE MANAGEMENT, INTEGRATION, AND DISSEMINATION
- (7) INTELLIGENCE DATA BASE STUDIES CONCERNING FOREIGN USE
- (8) COUNTERMEASURES, INCLUDING.
 - (a) Passive intrusion detection
 - (b) Shielding, jamming, and remote perturbation (RP)

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(U) Program tasking and priorities were then developed for each of the areas of interest.

b. RV Enhancement/Training (U)

(S/NOFORN/ORCON) The primary focus in the three-year program was the development of RV enhancement/training procedures. The purpose was to determine whether RV reliability could be enhanced, and whether RV technology could be transferred in a structured fashion from one individual to another. Positive findings in either area would have great significance with regard to both potential foreign threat and to US application. At the beginning of the three-year program a decision was made to develop and codify the most promising RV training procedures that had emerged from earlier work. Some of the initial training phases were already in hand; later stages were subsequently developed as the program progressed. The procedures focus on improving the reliability of remote viewing by controlling those factors that tend to introduce errors into the RV product. The RV training procedures are designed to proceed through six stages of proficiency, corresponding to six stages of increased contact with the target site. The method used for target designation in this training program was the coordinate method (see appendix I).

(S/NOFORN) As a measure of progress made with the implementation of the six-stage training procedures, data were obtained from the key SRI remote viewer before and after exposure to the training program. The viewer was targeted on a series of randomly selected worldwide test locations. These tests were

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carried out under strict protocols and double-blind conditions (neither monitor nor viewer know the target site) to prevent inadvertent disclosure of target information.



(S/NOFORN/ORCON) The accuracy of the descriptions was assessed on the basis of the accuracy rating scale shown in Table I. Results indicate that viewer performance improved through training. Prior to training, only 22 percent of the viewer responses from 100 tests were in the good to excellent category. After training, 66 percent of the data from 95 tests were rated as good to excellent. A statistical analysis of the first four and the last four tests from the after-training series was also performed to see if data quality at the end of this series was better than data quality at the beginning. Using the concept analysis technique discussed in the appendix II, the correct site was identified in three of these last four tests. A similar approach yielded one correct match (chance level) for the first four tests. This result, along with the over all 66 percent accuracy level, indicates that the training procedures were effective and that data quality improvements were achieved over time.

(S/NF/ORCON) To date, eleven individuals have been exposed to the training program, including three representatives sent from the Intelligence Community. Eight of these people had no previous RV experience. All progressed satisfactorily through initial stages of the training program.

(S/NOFORN) Results of the RV research leads to certain conclusions with regard to RV characteristics in general. These are listed in Table II.

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Table I

RV DATA ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

<u>ACCURACY RATING SCALE</u>	<u>DEGREE OF RV DATA CORRELATION TO TARGET</u>
0	LITTLE OR NO CORRESPONDENCE - SELF-EXPLANATORY. " A MISS."
1	SOME CORRESPONDENCE - MIXTURE OF CORRECT AND INCORRECT DATA. ENOUGH TO INDICATE POSSIBLE "ACCESS" TO THE SITE, ALTHOUGH CHANCE CANNOT BE RULED OUT. "AMBIGUOUS."
2	GOOD CORRESPONDENCE - GOOD DESCRIPTION WITH SEVERAL ELEMENTS MATCHING, BUT SOME INCORRECT INFORMATION. "A HIT."
3	EXCELLENT CORRESPONDENCE - EXCELLENT DESCRIPTION. UNAMBIGUOUS MATCHABLE ELEMENTS, WITH RELATIVELY LITTLE INCORRECT INFORMATION. "EXCELLENT HIT."

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TABLE II

REMOTE VIEWING CHARACTERISTICS

-
- o DESCRIPTIVE MATERIAL ABOUT REMOTE LOCATIONS THAT EXCEEDS CHANCE CORRELATION CAN BE OBTAINED.
 - o THE QUALITY OF DESCRIPTION APPEARS TO BE RELATIVELY INSENSITIVE TO DISTANCE.
 - o NONANALYTICAL DATA (SHAPE, FORM, CONFIGURATION, PATTERNS) ARE GENERALLY OF HIGHER QUALITY THAN ANALYTICAL DATA (NAME, FUNCTION, LABELING).
 - o DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE PATTERNS OF CORRECT/INCORRECT RESPONSE ELEMENTS INDICATES THAT THE LAWS GOVERNING REMOTE VIEWING ARE NOT ASKEW TO, BUT CORRELATE WITH THOSE LAWS GOVERNING
 - CEREBRAL (BRAIN) FUNCTIONING, SPECIALIZATION, AND COGNITIVE PROCESSING IN GENERAL,
 - SUBLIMINAL PERCEPTION IN PARTICULAR.
 - o ALTHOUGH THE MECHANISM OF TRANSMISSION IS AS YET UNDETERMINED, THE OBSERVED RESULTS ARE NOT NECESSARILY INCOMPATIBLE WITH ELECTROMAGNETIC OR QUANTUM MODELS.

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SECRETc. Intelligence Potential (U)

(S/NOFORN/ORCON/WN) Remote viewing for the intelligence community was begun in 1972 when SRI was contracted by CIA. A number of sites were viewed from this time to 1980 and the data were highly variable. That is, some good data were mixed with much extraneous or inaccurate information. In September of 1980, a joint DIA-Army project was initiated to improve the quality of the remote viewing data and to assist in the preparation of threat assessments. This project, GRILL FLAME, examined several methods for improving RV data quality. For instance, patterns in verbal data were examined to see if accuracy correlations could be found and several methods of site targeting were investigated. The major emphasis of the GRILL FLAME project, however, was to develop a training method that would increase the accuracy of the remote viewing data and establish that it is a transferable skill. When this project was begun, Army INSCOM had already established an in-house unit and had been producing data on operational sites since 1979. The Army INSCOM viewers have detected the remote site successfully in 50 percent of their projects (89 sites). The Army sent two people to SRI in 1982 to be trained in the system of remote viewing being developed there. One was removed from the program due to illness. The remaining viewer received additional training in FY 1983 with non-NFIP funds. He is now only several weeks away from being prepared to view operational sites. The Army plans to send two new trainees to SRI during FY 84 under non-NFIP funding.

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(S/NOFORN/ORCON) To determine whether progress in RV training carried over to operational tasking, the most advanced viewer at SRI was at various times targeted on sites of operational significance throughout the program to find out if he could collect information of intelligence value. This viewer was given 18 operational targets. Using the accuracy rating scale defined in Table I, intelligence analysts assigned ratings of good to excellent to approximately 40 percent of the RV responses. The effect of the RV training procedures can be seen in the data from this series. The accuracy rating average for the last five targets was 2.2 on the three-point scale;;the average from the first five (before training) was 1.4.

(S/NOFORN) A statistical analysis of the last five operational tests from this series also was performed. A person who did not know which set of RV data corresponded to the correct target was able to correctly match the data with the appropriate target site for all of these five tests. The probability of this result occurring by chance is less than one in a hundred. This statistical result provides additional support for the validity of RV under operational conditions.

(S/NOFORN/ORCON) Other less experienced SRI viewers also were also given targets of operational significance during this program. However, these viewers were not as advanced as the prime SRI viewer, and the RV sessions were carried out under exploratory conditions (different targeting techniques, greater target variety). Consequently, results of these sessions were not as successful, although they did provide insight useful for understanding operational problems in general.

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(S/NOFORN/ORCON/WN) In terms of over-all success, the advanced SRI viewer and the experienced INSCOM viewers achieved different success levels on operational tasks. These differences, though not large, probably resulted from a basic variation in approach between SRI and INSCOM. The SRI efforts were primarily exploratory and developmental, with emphasis on understanding the RV process, on improving analytical content of RV data, and on developing RV training procedures. The experienced INSCOM viewers were mainly concerned with operational problems, especially where intelligence data or intelligence inferences could be obtained from configuration aspects of RV data.

(S/NOFORN/ORCON/WN) Other variables that influence RV data content include the nature of the RV session (e.g., targeting method used, session timing), type of data desired, degree of viewer motivation, significance of the operational task, and background of the individual viewer. Sometimes operational tasks cannot be evaluated fully since knowledge of operational target data may be limited or even unavailable. Overall results between the SRI viewer and the INSCOM viewers were consistent (40 percent and 50 percent accuracy levels). These results clearly indicate that the RV phenomenon has intelligence application potential, especially where configurational aspects of RV data can be of value. However, improvement in RV data reliability for both configurational and analytical content is still required before application of RV data to intelligence tasks can become routine. Training procedures that were developed by SRI in FY 1983 show promise for increasing RV data reliability.

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(S/NOFORN/ORCON) Keeping these factors in mind, one nonetheless finds that data generated by remote viewers are often of high quality and, provided they are appropriately integrated into the intelligence data mix, can be of significant utility. Examples of successful remote viewings are given in appendix IV.

d. Other Project Results (U)

(S/NOFORN/ORCON) Following is a summary of other results obtained during the GRILL FLAME project:

o Evaluation Techniques

A concept evaluation technique was developed for assessing the accuracy of RV data. Details are given in Appendix II.

o Data Base Management (DBM)

A data base management system was developed to store and sort remote viewing data and intelligence data.

o Countermeasures

Literature searches regarding the underlying psychological foundation and physical mechanisms of remote viewing were performed. However, a sufficient data base for identifying these important issues was not available from the current research. A scientific understanding of RV phenomena should help enhance the potential for US applications, and

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should provide the necessary data for countermeasures design.

o Location/Tracking/Search:

Although some preliminary remote viewing studies and operational tasks have shown limited success with locating missing objects or people, this area is weak in comparison to remote viewing of fixed locations. Since operational requirements often exist for locating missing objects or people an R&D effort to develop this capability into a reliable tool should be pursued.

o Remote Viewing Data Enhancement

One potential method of isolating valid from invalid RV data was examined in this project. This method, audiolingustic analysis, evaluates the possibility of correlating valid RV data with speech patterns that occur during an RV session. Preliminary results suggest that such an approach has potential.

o RV Targeting methods

Methods for designating the RV target were examined. It was determined that several methods were suitable, including targeting on people and various forms of abstract targeting (e.g., coordinates). However, individual preferences were noted. Most viewers performed better with targeting techniques they preferred.

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SECRET**V. RECOMMENDATIONS**

(S/NOFORN) Based on key findings of the GRILL FLAME project, it is recommended that:

- o Applied intelligence-oriented research in remote viewing effort be continued.
- o Basic research in both remote viewing and psychokinesis phenomena be initiated.

(S/NOFORN/ORCON) It is further recommended that the application-oriented effort be centralized, with overall management provided by DIA, and that a close interaction with basic research be maintained. Should the quality of operational remote viewing continue to improve, it is recommended that a joint service remote viewing unit be established in FY-85 to respond to DoD requirements.

(S/NOFORN/ORCON/WN) Army INSCOM has, since before GRILL FLAME, had an in-house remote viewing staff to respond to operational requirements. It is recommended that this unit be continued in its present status. This capability permits operational testing of concepts and experimental results arrived at by SRI. It also serves as a proving ground for the SRI-trained remote viewers.

(S/NOFORN) A follow-on research program should have the following objectives:

1. To improve utility of remote viewing applications when both

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configurational and analytical data are important.

2. To identify and evaluate the feasibility of remote viewing for search and location tasks.
3. To examine a wide variety of psychokinetic (PK) effects so that validity of the phenomenon can be evaluated and its potential for military applications.
4. To evaluate (via replication) known and suspected foreign psychoenergetics research to determine the credibility of the work and to assess the potential threat of its applications to military weapon systems and other US national security interests.
5. To examine those aspects of psychoenergetics that show promise for developing countermeasures.
6. To pursue basic research for phenomena understanding. It is likely that PK effects offer the best chance for phenomena understanding, since a wide variety of scientific instrumentation and sensors can be applied to this problem.

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(S/NOFORN) Activities that can help achieve these objectives include:

1. Further development of RV training methodologies for a variety of applications, to include those suitable for enhancing analytical content of the data. Methodologies for selection and identification of people who have psychoenergetics talent and for skill development, in both RV and PK phenomenon, would also be developed.
2. Development of suitable experimental and operational data bases to permit adequate statistical evaluations so that RV phenomena repeatability, and application reliability, can be quantified in detail.
3. Further development of the most promising evaluation methodologies identified during the GRILL FLAME project, and expanded to include PK phenomena.
4. Thorough identification of all aspects of investigation protocols and safeguards required for each of the research and application projects that would be pursued.
5. Evaluation of the factors and techniques that affect psychoenergetics performance and utility. Methods to minimize effects that decrease reliability and to enhance effects that improve reliability would be identified.

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APPENDIX I

REMOTE VIEWING SESSION DETAILS



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APPENDIX I

REMOTE VIEWING SESSION DETAILS

1. The Session (U)

(U) To carry out a remote viewing (RV) session, a "remote viewer" and an "interviewer" begin by seating themselves at the opposite ends of a table in a special remote viewing room equipped with paper and pens, a tape recorder, and an overhead TV camera to permit recording for documentation, or monitoring by individuals outside the room. The room is homogeneously-colored, acoustic-tiled, and featureless, with light controlled by a dimmer, so that environmental distractions can be minimized.

(U) The session is begun by the interviewer providing to the remote viewer whatever targeting information is appropriate to the task at hand, such as the coordinates of a military site, or a picture of an individual. Under normal testing or operational conditions, the interviewer is typically kept blind as to the site to prevent inadvertent cueing. The session then proceeds with the interviewer repeating the targeting information at intervals and posing questions. The remote viewer generates verbal responses and sketches, until a coherent response to the overall task requirement emerges. The use of the quick reaction-response procedure has been found useful in minimizing imaginative embellishment.

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(U) Normal methods for achieving the proper mental state are used, session time at a single setting rarely exceeds an hour, and the ambience of the session is kept as natural and stress-free as possible.

2. Remote Viewing Data (U)

(U) The steps in producing a product from remote viewing (RV) sessions are as follows:

- a. The a "remote viewer" generates raw data in the form of a tape-recorder transcript of verbal comments, along with notes, sketches and drawings. On occasion, a videorecording of the session may also be made.
- b. The raw data is summarized in one- or two-pages and affixed to the typed transcript with associated notes, sketches, and drawings from the RV session. This data package is turned over to the consumer for analysis.
- c. Following preliminary analysis, the above procedure may be iterated a number of times to produce additional data in response to analyst questions.
- d. Finally, the analyst fills out an evaluation sheet covering the usefulness of the RV product and the data is integrated into the

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overall intelligence mix in whatever way is appropriate. Statistical analysis is also applied, depending on the nature of the task and on the availability of a suitable data base.

3. Personnel (U)

(U) Historically, the search for medical, psychological, and personality measures that might provide a quantitative "psychic profile" for identifying remote viewers has been unsuccessful.

(U) Several years of observation by workers in the field has, however, led to an informal guide based on subjective evaluation of the personality traits of successful viewers. This rule-of-thumb guide is based on the observation that successful remote viewers tend to be confident, outgoing, and adventurous. They are successful individuals with some artistic bent and with "middle-of-the-road" views about psychoenergetics. Neither "total skeptics" nor "true believers" tend to do well on psychoenergetic tasks. Successful remote viewers come from the ranks of photographers, engineers, mathematicians, artists and businessmen who have a relaxed interest in the phenomenon and who are challenged by it.

(U) Recently, SRI researchers cooperated with a private group (Mobius Group, Los Angeles, CA) to conduct a mass RV screening test, with psychological

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profiling, through a major magazine publication.¹ The data base of several thousand entries should assist in identifying valid profiling information.

4. The Target (U)

(S/NOFORN) The term "target" refers to a geographic location, a photo of that location, or to some other type of data which the viewer is asked to describe. Target descriptions generated by viewers are usually sketches and verbal descriptions of geometric features that they perceive to be present at the target location. Viewers sometime provide judgments of the function or purpose of the target area. These targets can vary from near-by locations to very long distances from the viewer.

(S/NOFORN) To help evaluate remote viewing phenomenon, several types of targets are used:

- o Practice and calibration targets - these are selected at random from a large group of diverse geographic targets. They are used to acquaint the viewer with remote viewing and for training. They enable preliminary judgments on data accuracy.

¹S. A. Schwartz and R. DeMattei, "Psi-Q Test II," OMNI, p. 136 (October 1982).

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- o Evaluation targets -- these are also chosen from a large group of possibilities, and are used in tightly controlled sessions for technical assessment purposes. They enable judgments on accuracy of the viewer's data and help in assessing potential of the phenomenon.
- o Operational targets - these are actual targets of military interest, such as US facilities or USSR sites from which data are available or can eventually be obtained. Targets of this type provide a basis for judgments regarding utility of remote viewing phenomenon in a real operational environment.

5. Targeting Methods (U)

(S/NOFORN) "Targeting" refers to the method used, during the remote viewing session, for specifying or designating where the target for that session is located. Some type of "targeting" method is needed to psychologically assist the viewer in accessing the desired data.

(S/NOFORN) Two basic targeting methods are used:

- o Beacon Person Method -- a person known to the viewer is present at the target location (or is looking at the target picture) during the remote viewing period. The viewer is then asked to describe what this person (beacon person) is observing at that time. The beacon person can be located at any distance from the viewer.

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- o Coordinate Method -- In this case, the desired target is designated simply as "the location at coordinate _____ and _____", or by some other means. The viewer is then asked to describe what is present at "Target X", or at the specified coordinates. In this case, a beacon person is not necessary, and long distance experiments become practical for any remote location. The coordinate method was chosen as the basic technique for the RV training method developed at SRI during the GRILL FLAME project.

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APPENDIX II
STATISTICAL METHODS



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APPENDIX II

STATISTICAL METHODS

1. Introduction (U)

(U) In addressing the remote viewing (RV) evaluation question, there are two separate requirements:

- o Absolute evaluation of a single response for a single unknown target.
- o Relative evaluation of set of responses for a series of known targets.

(U) The first of these is of the most interest in an operational setting. This has been considered in two ways. First, by conducting an operational RV session between two calibration RV sessions where the target is known, a tentative assessment of operational efficacy can be determined. The evaluation is made on the basis of performance during the calibration sessions, and on the basis of adherence to a predetermined session structure.

(U) A second technique for an a prior evaluation was explored as part of the Fiscal Year 1982 program in an audiolinguistic task. This task provided indications that careful linguistic analysis, when coupled with technical audio analysis, could yield an assessment of probable success in the absence of knowledge about the target.

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(U) Various techniques have been used in the past in an attempt to solve the relative evaluation problem. The most common of these was the simple rank ordering of all responses, as assessed against all possible targets used in an experimental series. In this procedure, a judge is presented with all RV transcripts and all target sites. His task is to arrange the transcripts in order of the best to least match for each of the targets. A simple numerical counting procedure is then used to estimate the likelihood that the judge's transcript and target matches are by chance alone. This early technique contained little systematic structure for determining the final order of matches.

(S) The first step toward systematizing the rank order judging procedure was to preprocess the raw data in the transcript by "conceptualizing" both the verbal and the pictorial responses. Conceptualizing a transcript requires an analyst to paraphrase the transcript into a list of coherent statements. This concept list is then compared and scored concept-by-concept to each of the targets. The resulting scores are averaged for each response, and all responses are rank-ordered on the basis of these scores.

(U) The problem with the above technique is that there are no guidelines as to how the analyst should paraphrase the transcript; furthermore, the method in which the concepts are to be assessed against the targets remains undefined. The purpose of the evaluation task in FY 1982 was to identify a procedure that corrects these deficiencies.

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2. Concept Analysis Procedure (U)

(U) In this analysis procedure¹, there are four separate steps: remote viewer response, target/task definition, quality assessment, and numerical analysis.

(U) The remote viewers response is prepared for analysis by reducing the data to a coherent set of concepts. A concept is defined as a summary of a single idea that has been expressed in the RV verbal or drawing response. This summary is prepared by someone not familiar with the target.

(U) To utilize an analysis procedure that is capable of quantitative assessment, it is necessary to define, in advance, what the goals of the assessment are. "Element of target" and "relevance" are provided to clearly define the goal of the analysis. In the ideal situation, an RV target should be completely specified in advance. A target typically consists of a number of target elements, each of which may have varying relevance with regard to the overall RV task. For any given target, an independent list of target elements should be prepared. The selection of what constitutes a target element is left completely to the discretion of the task coordinator. The target elements must be selected with little regard to task relevance

¹See reference 1.b in bibliography for details.

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(target elements relevance is accounted for later). Because an RV target consists, in principal, of an essentially infinite number of possible elements, discretion needs to be exercised in the selection process to minimize analysis time.

(U) For each target element identified for the site, the task coordinator must define a relevance rating. This rating allows the coordinator to tailor the analysis to the task requirements. Relevance ratings vary from "trivial" (1) to "key" (5).

(U) The quality assessment is done on the basis of how well the single concept in question matches the selected target element. The judgement is made without regard to any other issues, such as importance of the concept to the transcript, and can range from poor (1), to excellent (5).

(U) An intermediate numerical score is computed for each concept by the product of the relevance and quality ratings.

(U) To determine a final evaluation of the complete transcript assessed against a given target, a weighted average of concept scores is computed. At this point in the evaluation protocol, the following options are available, depending on the task requirement:

- o A rank ordering of the targets on the basis of the weighted averages of concept scores.

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- o A simple selection of the best match.
- o A statistical evaluation on a concept-by-concept basis.

(S) A series of four remote viewings that were performed as calibrations during operational sessions at DIA in December 1981 are used to illustrate this technique. In this series the remote viewing products were of relatively high quality, but nonetheless required a sensitive technique to differentiate because of the similarity of the targets and, hence, of the descriptions. Application of this assessment technique resulted in the correct blind matching (highest scoring in matches versus cross matches) of three of the four calibration targets. This result indicated that remote viewing was effective during this session, and that the RV data generated would contain some valid information about the operational target of interest.

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APPENDIX III

FUNDING LEVELS



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SECRET**APPENDIX III
FUNDING LEVELS**

- I. TOTAL FUNDS RECEIVED FOR THREE-YEAR PROGRAM
- A. FY 1981 - \$ 418.5K
 - B. FY 1982 - 518
 - C. FY 1983 - 539
- \$1475.5K
- II. TOTAL FUNDS RECEIVED BY SERVICE
- A. DIA - \$962K
 - B. ARMY INSCOM - \$313.5K
 - C. DARPA - \$200K
- III. TOTAL BY TASK (BUDGETED AMOUNT)
- | | |
|------------------------------|-----------|
| A. RV Enhancement (training) | \$ 575K |
| B. Intelligence Studies | 287 |
| C. Data Base Management | 168 |
| D. Countermeasures | 99 |
| E. Administration | 97.5 |
| F. Audio Analysis | 70 |
| G. Targeting | 54 |
| H. Search Methodology | 45 |
| I. RV Ops | 40 |
| J. RV Evaluation | <u>40</u> |
| | \$1475.5K |

III-1

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APPENDIX IV

EXAMPLES OF REMOTE VIEWING DATA



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
EXAMPLES OF RV DATA FROM TRAINING SESSIONS

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UNCLASSIFIED

34° 4' 43.497" N
107° 37' 3.819" W

CPYRGHT



(a) SITE

UNCLASSIFIED


descent — C
 adis. Hoover Dam —
 Breaks
 A tall
 B structure 5
 A angles
 B Building off.
 ad dish antennas —
 huge —
 rows of them

(b) RV RESPONSE

(U) RADIO TELESCOPE ARRAY; SOCORRO, NEW MEXICO

UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED



(b) RV RESPONSE

(U) GLEN CANYON DAM, UTAH

CPYRGHT




(a) SITE

UNCLASSIFIED


UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



like radio tower c-5
flat area c
smalls
(b) RV RESPONSE

CPYRGHT



(a) SITE

UNCLASSIFIED


(U) ANTENNA ARRAY; LOST HILLS, CALIFORNIA

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

buildings - Nor.
oil well. C
oil field S
Several wells C
Pumping - C
oil typical oil
field -
tower
1- 1- 1- 1-
1- + 1 1 1
56 Libya. and
Break
not very good
stage 4S

CPYRGHT



UNCLASSIFIED (a) SITE

(b) RV RESPONSE

(U) SAHARA OILFIELDS

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

EXAMPLES OF RV DATA FROM OPERATIONAL SIMULATIONS

IV-6

SECRET

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

SECRET

SG1A

SITE:

SG1A

SG1A

SITE DESCRIPTION: The site is an airfield

INFORMATION PROVIDED TO REMOTE VIEWER:


Coordinates of the site (latitude and longitude in degrees, minutes and seconds); no other information given.

RESULTS:

Viewer correctly described site as an airport adjacent to a large body of water, and provided pasteup/drawing shown in following page.

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

(U) REMOTE VIEWER'S PASTUP/DRAWING OF

SG1A

IV-10

UNCLASSIFIED

SG1C

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SECRET

SG1A

SITE: [REDACTED]

SG1A

SITE DESCRIPTION: Site is the main gathering center, [REDACTED] with processing plants and holding tanks.

INFORMATION PROVIDED TO REMOTE VIEWER:

Coordinates of the site (latitude and longitude in degrees, minutes and seconds); no other information given.


RESULTS:

Viewer correctly described site as an oilfield with blowoff towers, processing equipment, tanks, and provided pasteup/drawings shown on next page.

IV-13

SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED



(U) REMOTE VIEWER'S PASTEUR/DRAWING OF

SG1A

IV-13

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SECRET

Examples of RV data from Operational Tasks (via INSCOM viewers)

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